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- HE increasing variability in the value of the U.S.
dollar in foreign exchange markets has recently been
the basis for discussion about the currency in which
certain internationally traded commodities are priced.
In particular, petroleum exporting countries have
given some consideration to the feasibility of (lenomi-
nating the world price of oil in terms of the Special
Drawing Right (SDR), rather than the U.S. dollar.’
The primary function of the SDR, however, is not that
of an international numeraire. Rather, the SDR was
created in the late 1960s to augment what was then
generally perceived to he a deficiency of international
reserves.
INTERNATIONAl., RESERVES
When the residents of a cotmtry import goods and
services or invest in capital assets abroad, payment
must be made in a manner acceptable to the ex-
porters. Gold, currencies of other countries which the
exporters are willing to accept, and the exporting
country’s domestic currency are international means
of payment. The amomsts of gold and internationally
acceptable currencies (other than a country’s domes-
tic currency) which a nation has at its disposal for
making final payment to foreign exporters are its
international reserves.2
l”OPEC Might Switch to S.D.R.s If Dollar Plunsments,
Official Says,” New York Times, August 4, 1977, “Kuwait
Wants OPEC To Switch From Dollar To SDR-Based Pric-
ing,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 1977, and Gary R.
Gray, “SDRs and the Oil Price,” New York Journal of
Commerce, December 10, 1977.
~The importance of gold as an international reserve asset has
declined significantly since the early 1970s. Doring 1976,
olfieial gold balances accounted for less than 20 percent of
total intern atiota
1
reserve assets. For a discussion see Ilang—
Sheng Chet m g and Nicholas P. Sargeti, ‘‘The Chatiging Role
of ( old in the lnterr,atii inal \Ititi ct at-v S vstei ,,‘‘ Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Business Review ( Winter
1971—75 ) , pp - 5— 15. The ft ireigo enrrenev vol Oponelit of
itcr0 atio’,al reserves also mel ndt’s ceotral hanks’ hol (lu’gs of
marketable securities dennu imated in foreign currencies.
I ‘nt-frr i’IXCII LXCIiafll’e Rate-s
Until the early l970s, most countries had agreed
upon the relative values of their currencies and acted
ill foreign exchange markets so as to attempt to pre-
serve these relationships hetween currency values.’
Under this, system of fixed relative values for national
currencies, central banks bought and sold reserve
assets at prices fixed in tenns of their own domestic
currencies, For example, suppose a particular country
was maintaining the international value of one unit of
its currency at one U.S. dollar. If importers in this
country demanded dollars to pay for foreign goods
and scm-vices, their own central bank would exchange
dollars for domestic currency on a one-for-one basis.
If this central bank’s holdings of dollars were insuffi-
cient to satisfy the importers’ demand for dollars, it
could obtain additional dollars by purchasing or bor-
rowing them from another central bank. Direct pur-
chases resulted in an exchange of gold or some inter-
nationally acceptable currency for U.S. dollars. In
turn, the dollars were sold to domestic importers for
domestic currency. The central hank’s holdings of
international reserves would thereby be reduced.
TlltIs, a deficit ill a country’s balance of payments
(for example, due to a current account deficit not
being offset by a capital account surplus) implied a
decline in its central bank’s holdings of international
reserves, since balance-of-payments deficits were set-
tled by flows of international reserves from deficit
National currencies are hought arid sold in foreign exchange
markets. The price of one currency in tenns of another is the
exc’haiige rate hetweeti the two ciira-i I eies, Throughotit this
paper it is assumed that exchange rates ‘vere fixed as single
values. Currency values were in fact generally allowed to
fluctuate within ± 1% of a fixed single value. For a discus-
sion of the par value exchange rate regime which existed
until March 1973, see Helmut W. Mayer, “The Anatomy of
Official Exchange-Rate Inten-ention Systems,” Essays in inter-
national Finance, no. 104 (Princeton: Princeton University,
May 1974).
Page 9FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1978
to surplus nations.4 The one exception to this was
when the deficit nation’s domestic currency was inter-
nationally acceptable. When the domestic currency
of a particular nation was acceptable to foreign ex-
porters, importers in that country could use their
local currency to pay for foreign-made goods. In
addition, the currency cotild also be used to pur-
chase capital assets abroad. As a result, that country
could pay for an increasing amount of imports by
increasing its domestic money supply. In this case,
however, importers could continue to pay for foreign
goods and securities with their domestic currency
only so long as foreign exporters remained willing
to accept that currency.
(7:51,/er “c/earth, Floating” Exchange R.ates
If a conntry allows its currency to “float cleanly”,
then the value of that currency in tenns of other
currencies is established hy the supply and demand
conditions arising from all foreign exchange market
transactions undertaken by the private sector (and
those actions of governments undertaken for purposes
other than affecting exchange rates). When individ-
uals or husinesses require foreign currency to pay for
foreign goods or capital assets, they can purchase that
currency with their domestic currency in foreign ex-
change markets. An increased demand for the for-
eign currency results in a rise in the number of units
of domestic currency required to purchase one unit of
the foreign currency (the “price” of the foreign cur-
rency rises).
Such market-determined changes in the relative
values of national currencies would automatically pre-
vent the appearance of balance-of-payments deficits
and surpluses. This is because the exchange rate
would adjust until the amount demanded for a cur-
rency equalled the ansount supplied, with no central
hank becoming a siet absorber or supplier in foreign
exchange markets. For example, as a country’s cur-
rency’ declines in value relative to other currencies,
the prices of foreign goods in terms of that natiorfs
currency rise. Consequently, imports tessd to decline.
At the same time, prices of the country’s goods in
terms of foreign currencies fall, thus tending to in-
crease exports~,r~ Hence, the nation’s imports fall and
~Thbal 115cc of pas lot nt’, ms difluid hi ic is th sun’ of all
iiiternatinoah trw,sa-tions crc
1
n rlhig thost’ of tI tonetar
authorities. For an explanation of the current amid capital
accounts, see Donald S. Kemp, “l3alanee-of—Payments Con-
cepts — What Do They Really Mean?” this Review (July
1975), pp. 17-21.
For examp Ic, suppose the vu ri-c-iit ‘-all me of one British porn 1(1
is t‘s-n 1 -S. (101la’s. Go,‘(Is prie-d at twi i dollars in the U.S.
svnt 1(1 he pricc-d at title potind in the t ‘mutc’d Kit, gdoni ( i gi itir—
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its exports rise, thereby reducing (and ulti-
mately eliminating) the do\vnward pressure on the
currency.6
Since balance-of-payments deficits and surpluses
would not emerge under a “cleanly floating” exchange
rate system, accumulation of international reserves to
settle balance-of-payments deficits would be unneces-
sary and tile level and growth of international reserves
unimportant. However, exchange rates are seldom
allowed to ‘‘float cleanly”.
j Sb i I m K ~( / J Ut I rig I sr,, i (~ U
Since the early 1970s an increasing number of
countries have allowed the international values of
their domestic currencies to be determined, to vary-
ing extent, by the supply and demand conditions
prevailing in foreign exchange markets. Central
banks, however, often intervene in foreign exchange
markets to smooth day-to-day changes in the relative
values of their currencies.5 Government intervention
occurs when a central bank either buys or sells its
national currency in foreign exchange markets for the
sole purpose of influencing its currency’s relative
ilig transport costs, tarilfs, etc. ) . If the U.K. imports more
iron, the U.S. than it exports tti the U.S., the dollar value of
the poutid will dec-hoe. This i-esults Iions ill I iiicreased de-
mand for U.S. dollars in the foreign exchange market. As
British importers ii unease their demand for U.S. dollars, the
‘‘price” of tile dollar in tcnns of pounds will rise — i.e., tile
number of dollars which earl be ‘‘purchased” for one pound
will fall. Suppose the value of title pound declines to one
(lollar. The goods pticed at tsvti dollars in the U.S. arc now
p-iced at I no poinids in tho UK Convem-sely, goods priced
at ,nie pound in the U.K. would has-c been initially priced at
two dnllars in the U.5. After the de-line in the pounds rela-
tive s-al, me, the price of such gisods in the U.S. would have
declined to (‘tie dollar.
“As the do~viward pressure on the enrrencv abates, investors
bean lie rutS c svi fling to nivest in that coinitry. Thus, capital
I,ju,veniemits aIso iielji to stabilize I lie exchange rate.
~Fo r exuuiIple. see Ravniond F. NIikeseil and ILenny N. Gold-
stein, “Rules for a Floating-Rate Regine,” Essays in inter-
national Fiuat d~, jun. 109 ( Princeton: Prince ton Utiivcrsity,
April 1975), p. 1.5. They also indicate that, even under a
float 1mg mate systen I. I u atitil 5 miii ght eontinile to mi iaintain hal—
atlet’s (if reserve assets.
5
Because of leads and lags in the adjustment of trade patterns
(and possibly capital flows) to changes in exchange rates, an
ec’nmloll IV in diseqi iihi mm in would oscillate back toward ass
c’quihihriuus posit in,I. These ciseillations, if not smoothed,
wonId em tail avoidalsic c-tssts in tonitis of resource clue. Flow’—
(‘vi-r, privutc’ sector speculatitsii enithd pm-nvide these snsonth—
iiig eficc’ts as well as, and piissibli’ better than, guse rnmeut
iritirvin itin,, - Sce Nlilton Fricdi,jar i, ‘‘The Case hi r Flexible
J-:.xc-hui,sg’ Rat i-s,‘‘ in I-s,sa t/.C in Posit iI;c F(‘Otto iiiics ( (:hic’ago
University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 157-203, and
enfh-ev F. Wood, “The Witteveen Facility,” IISIF Supple—
tile‘itory Fit,at,ring l’acilily, t‘.5. Gringnus, Senate Comant—
tee on B as kit ig, Ilousir ig, and tjrhsan Allairs, 95t Ii (:00g.,
1st Ness,, October 3, .1977, pp. 76-79.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1978
value.u To tile extent that central banks intervene S
foreign exchange markets, both the level and grosvth
of international reserves remain important.
Prolonged one—way government intervention re-
sults in the relative values of \‘ariotss currencies being
different from the valises which would result if ex-
change rates n-crc allowed to “float cleanly”. Since
relative currency valises are thereby prevented from
fully adjustisig to changes in international capital flows
and in importers’ demand for, and exporters’ ssipplv
of, foreign currencies, balance-of—payments deficits
and sttrpltsses still persist. The persistence of a
balance—of—payments deficit itnplies that the deficit
countrys central hasik is purchasing its domestic cur-
reticy’ with reserve assets (that is., foreign cufl-etlcies
in foreign exchange markets.11 This course of action
reduces tile sstppiv of a deficit country’s ccsrrency in
foreign exchange markets. The “price” of the cssrrency
in terms of other c’urreslcies is thereby preveslted from
declining sufficiently to reduce the deficit. Such pur-
chases call cositinue oniy so long as tile deficit coun-
try’s holdisigs of international reserves do siot run out
(or so long as they can he supplesnented hy
horrowing).
Tlsus, usldler the ctsrrent “massaged floating” ex-
change rate system, haiasiee—of-payments deficits can
he respossded to by a combination of reset-ye flows
and exchange rate changes. To the extent that a
deficit country chooses to “support” its currency’ (that
is, prevent its currencvs relative value frosn declining
sufficiently to fully correct the deficit), balance-of-
payments deficits are financed (hut not corrected) by’
outflosvs of reserves.
Fraesu.ron. ff0711 Ftees.! i0
Floetieg r.xche.n.ge B..e!es
Under the system of fixed exchange rates, which
existed pnor to the earle’ 1970s, the values of mnan~’
currencies were fixed in terms of either tile U.S.
dollar or tile Britisis pound sterling.
1
’ The values of
051tell illterser tints c-jill hi’ difflcsilt to identify- 1’or exam,uphc, if
a natint‘aI govertinscut purc-hsasc’s ni ihitary eqiupnment abroarl
or ,,,akes a payment ‘aider a foreigi i aid pi-isgrau I. supply and
demand conditions in the foreign cxyuange 151st rket ss’il I
ehsaisge. These al-c not is ,t ervesithmist pu
1
iCv actiotus’ cliiieNS
they are tined tt, aff,-c-,t list’ exc’lsai ge rate,
sterhe size of the current U.S. bahance-sf—trade deficit is due
n part ti s the iii mnell asy (if t --S. (lollsirs Isy fnreigru central
banks. In effect, other central banks’ intervention in foreign
exchange markets prevents tile rhtsllar’s foreign cxchassge value
from declining sufficiently to discourage U.S. imports assd
encourage U.S. exports.
11By August 13, 1971. only 5o fthe 118 International Mmnu-
I any I”usid menslien c-ni, utri Cs hail intl fled the Finid that
the dollar asid sterling, in turn, were fixed in terms of
gold. Since the U.S. and U.K. governments gssaranteed
other central banks that dollars and sterling could he
converted into gold. central hanks in gencrai regarded
their dollar and sterhng haianees as heisig “as good as
goid. Thus, doHar and sterhissg halances were used to
supplement gold as international reserves.
The supply of international reserves, for the most
part, depended upon continuing US. balance—of—
payinessts deficits. TIle United States horsght foreign
goods and capital assets with dollars, which were then
aceutnulated lix- foreign central banks. These dollar
haiances were subsequently tssed by’ vanous foreign
eerstrai banks to finance tileir own halance-of—paymeslts
deficits. The world suppl” of issternationai reserves
was thus largely’ dependent upon the domestic ceo-
nonsic policies of the United States. Reductions in the
U.S. deficit wonid “.drv up the largest sossrce of
additions to reserves.”52
Whiie other central banks were willing to accept
dollars as reserve assets, foreign holdings of dollars
could not expasid sufficiently to satisfy foreign cesitral
banks’ desnasld for reserves svithout a cosltinuous U.S.
haiance—of—pav~nentsdeficit. The Usiited States couid
not continue runslislg balance-of-payments deficits,
however, without casting doubt upon tile ability of
the U.S. Government to maisitaiss the fixed relative
value of the dollar,’’ This wotsld ultimately reduce
confidence in tile doHar asan international reserve
asset.
Ihe elimination of the U.S. deficit and a corres-
posiding reduction in the growth of international re-
serves dtsrissg the last half of the 1960s ied to increas-
ing usscertainty as to 110w ftsture increases in the
demand for reserves could he satisfied. It was against
this background that the International Monetary
Fwid (IMF ) member countries decided to create an
international reserve asset.’4 The supply of, and con—
their currencies were “Iloatmug”. ‘l’he major “floating” cur—
rencies at that tinse were the Canadian dusllar, German
usark, and l)uteh gi,i Ider.
12Margaret Garritseis de Vnies, The international Moimetat-y
Fund 1966-1971, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: International
Nksuc-tary F’with, 1976 1, p. 26.
t3For art extended discussion of this analysis, see Rohert
‘i’rillisu, Gold and t/le Dollar Crisis (New haves,: Yale
1’Isis-c sit v Press, 1 96(1) , at id Jolin Wihiamsor,. ‘ Lu I cilia—
jiltVSl I~hinRIfty:A Scirvc’v,’’ Leonoitnc iourttai ( Sept ember
1973 . pp. 685-739, especially pp. 735—38.
14The 1MF is an hiternational institution among whose ilur—
ptsses are to “proissote irsternatinisal ninnctary cooperation
facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of ml erna—
tionah trade ...shorten the duration and lessen the degi-ee
of disequihihsrium in the issternational balances of payments
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fidence in, this new asset would he independent of
any one country’s domestic economic policies.
ROLE OF SOBs-;
The new type of reserve asset which was created
to help improve the fussetioning of the international
payments system was the Special Drawing Right.
which came into existence in 196~,’5 SDRs xvere
created as bookkeeping entries and were essentially
given to all IMF member countries electimsg to receive
tlsem. These bookkeeping entries were desigssed to he
transferred directly between central banks in settle-
ment of balance-of-payments deficits, with the IMF
guaranteeing their value its terms of a fixed amount of
gold. Actual holders of SDRs have included only the
central bassks assd Treasuries of IMF member corns-
tries which have agreed to accept them, and the IMF
itself, Private institutions (such as commercial banks)
and individuals (such as importers and exporters)
cannot hold SDRs.
SOP as a Reserve Asset
International transactions were being conducted
within a system of generally fixed exchange rates at
the time the SDR facility was established. The SDR
was created to provide an alternative source for ssseet-
ing isscreases in the densand for reserves. By ailocatitsg
SDRs, the world suppiy of reserves could be ang-
nsented while tue U.S. balance-of-paynsents deficit
cotild he corrected. Elimination of the U.S. deficit
would ensure confidence that the prevailing foreign
currency value of the doHar could he maintained. The
fixed exchange rate system could thus be preserved,
with the SDR hecoining the main reserve asset.
With changes in the supply of SDRs requiring the
approval of 85 percesst of ssearly ail IMF mesnher
cousltries’ votissg pow’er, the supply of reserves could
he placed cinder multinational control.’” Since the
total supply of reserves would he largely independent
of any one country’s policy decisiosss, excessive its-
of members.” See IMF Survey, Supplement on the Fund
(Fall 1976), p. 1.
‘~.& detailed account of the eyohc,tiois of SDRs is presented
by de Vnies, International Monetary Fund 1966-1971, pp.
11—250. Also see Martiss Barrett, “Activation of the Special
Drawing Rights Facility in the IMF,” Federal Reserve Bassk
of New York Monthly Review (February 1970), pp. 40-46.
‘“Only those sssemnbers participating in the SDR scheme cars
volc~on all sealintus au d c-aucellatinsns of SDRs..-\s csf April
31), .1 977, osdv ci ghs t of the 130 IMF 555cmher cot uustries were
rmnt participating in the 8DB facility. The 14 participathig
cmustnies classified as “mndusti-malized” held alsout 60 percent
of I ntssl sates, witis tise L’S. ahosse holdissg 21 h,ercenst.
creases in reserves and the resultant inflationary pres-
sures could, it \s’as hoped, be avoided.’7
The accomplishment of these objectives depended
uposs the SDR significantly reducissg the importance
of boIls gold and the U.S. dollar as reserve assets. If,
on the other hand, central banks’ holdings of SDRs
did not comprise the isnslk of reserve assets, significant
changes its total reserves could not be accomplished
by cisangmg the stspply of SDRs.
‘l’he large U.S. haiance-of-paynsents deficits in the
early 1970s, lsow’ever. rendered the purposes for which
SDRs were created irrelevant. The huge amounts of
dollars accumulated lsy’ foreigss central banks resulted
in a significant reduction in confidence in the ability’
of the U.S. to nsaintain the fixed value of the dollar.
As central banks’ willitigness to hold dollars as reserve
assets dechssed, they attempted to purclsase other cur-
rencies and gold with dollars. The resulting large
increases in the supply of doilars in foreigss exclsange
markets brought tise entire structure of fixed exchange
rates nnder increasing pressure and eventually be-
came a major factor its tise movemetit toward a sys-
tens of relatively flexible exchange rates.’5
Ouo.atilatmve ic/feels or SOPs
onln.ternatzoaat ne/sr fl’LS
Aithough the SDR isas become generally accepted
as ass international reserve asset, the quantitative
impact of SDRs tspon total interssational reserves has
been relatively minor. Following their initial alloca-
tion in 1970, SDRs accounted for about 3 percent of
total issternational reserves; following the second and
third allocations in 1971 and 1972, SDRs accounted
for about 5 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of
total world reserves. 5n Sissee no furtiser aHocations of
1
7
For a discussion tsf the issfiatiosuary impact of resen’e growth
durissg the early 1970s, see David I. Fasud, “World Reserves
arid
1
World hstflatmnss,’’ Baust-a Nazionahe del Lavtsro Quarterly
Reciew (Decciusher 1975), pp. 347-69.
‘
t
Fnr an analysis of the collapse (if the fixed exchange rate
system, see John Williamson, The Failure of World Alone-
ta,y Reform, 1971-74 (London: Thomas Nelson amid Sons
Ltd., 1977), pp. 1-52.
5 °SDRswere allocated, to those IMF member cousrstnies which
elected to receive theiss, in lsropcsrtioss to the size of each
cnnntrys quota. Uj,ois becoming a ruseinsher of the IMF, a
ccsnr,t ry suust agree upots thst’ size of its qoot a. ‘fives sty—five
percent of tlse quota is tlepositcd in the fnrs,s of isis iister—
i,atios,al reserve asset ( usually gold (Sr U.S. dnhhars ) . The
reusaitsissg 75 percemst is depositcd in, the form of the coun-
try’s domestic cnnieusey. These qtsotas theis forisu a pool of
151 F is ueisslx’rs’ en,rresscies froiss wlsichs orue ssuc’sssber cast
hsorrnsv another tuu’isuher’s currc-’ncy. ‘l’he specific SDR alhoca—
tinrit were: SDR 3.41 lsihhion on January 1, 1970 (each
participant received 16.8 pereesit of its quota), SDR 2.95
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SDRs have heess made since 1972, the total amoutst
of SDRs in existessce has remaissed at 9.31 billion,. As
total interssationai reserves have risess continsuously
since 1972, the proportion accounted for b SDRs has
progressively declined, represetstimsg omslv about 4 per-
cent of tise total durissg 1976.
SDRs were allocated (witis tlse intesstioss of increas-
ing ti,e amousst of internatiossal reserves) during a
period iss wisich total international reser’.-es, particu-
larly the foreigts currency compotsemst, were rising very
rapidly.- l)uring tlse same three—year period iss wisiels
SDRs were allocated (1970-72), the Ussited States ran
substantial haiance-of-payments deficits. Foreign cess-
tral baisks accttnsulated large asssoussts of dollars,
fun-tiser increasissg tlseir hoidissgs of is,terssational re-
serves. The foreign exchange component of interssa-
tionai reserves (prinsarihv dollars) snore thams doubled
over time 1970-72 period, as total world resemves rose
by more tlsams 50 percenst. Thus, foreigms currency
holdissgs Isave become the iargest cosssponent of inter-
national reserve balances, and the SDR has never as-
susned tise role of snain reserve asset that was
etsvisaged for it.
SOP as a tJni.t of Accoun.•t
In recent years, the SDR has heen increasingly
used as an international unit of account. The SDR
isas been clsosess, or is tmder consideratios,, as tlse ref-
erence value for establishing prices of certaiss inter-
nationally ptnrchased services (air fares and canal
toils). Proposals for pricisig internationally traded
hasic comn,odities, stsch as petroleum, its terms of
SDRs have also beets made as a result of tue van-
ability of the U.S. dollar’s value in foreign exclsange
markets.
The “basket” metisod currentiy used by tIse IMF to
establish tise value of the SDR is the reason for its use
as a unit of account in transactions not involving the
IMF.2° Since nsid-1974, tlse daiiy vaitse of the SDR
has been consputed as a weigisted average of tise U.S.
doHarvalues of sixteen currencies.2t
billion in 1971 (10.7 percent of quotas), and SDR 2.95
h,ilhinusu its 1972 (10.7 percesst of qnuotas). The U.S. received
a cnsrnulative allocatious of SDR 2.3 l,ihhinus, abomit 25 percesst
of the total ahlocateti.
20
Trasssactions involving the IMF are denoussinated us SDRs.
2
iPrior to July 1, 1974, the va]ase of the SDR had been fixed
at 0.888671 grans of fine gold. Under Use current snethod of
valuitsg the SDR in, tcrssis of a ‘‘eusrrency basket,” the U.S.
dollar, Gerusuan u mark, British prsousd sterlissg, and Japanuese
yen u receive a cusnsslsisictl weight of over 60 n,eueesut. For ass
esanssplc of the ad-trial calciulatissss of the U.S. dcslhar value
of one SDR, see IMF Survey, July 8, 1974, pp. 209, 213-14.
The value of the SDR in terms of atsy omse currency
lsas normnaily fluctuated less tlsass the exchange rate
hetiveess specific curremicies. Durissg the two years
endissg November 1977, for example. mo,sth-to-montls
changes in the dollar valise of tlse SDR remained
withi,s a band of 2 percentage points. In contrast, the
U.S. dollar values of the Cassadiass dollar, German
nsark, Japanese yess, and poussd sterling fluctuated
witlnss baisds of ahonst 5.5 percent, 5 percent, 6 per-
cent, and 8 percemrt, respectively. This relative sta-
hihitv of tlse valise of tlse SDR, as compared to the
dollar, sssakes it an attractive alternative to the dollar
as a basis for pt-icissg internationally traded goods and
services dtsring periods in which the relative value of
the dollar is falling (or is volatile).
Pricissg basic comnuodities in terms of SDRs, rather
thass in terms of the U.S. dollar, can he one way for
countries exporting such commodities to reduce fluc-
tuations in the over-all value of their export earnings.
Denominating the prices of exported commodities
(such as oil) in terms of SDRs rather than dollars
would restraim, the decline in the value of export
revenues in terms of a currency other than the dollar
when the dollar’s value ins foreign excisange markets
is declining. (On the other hand, a link between the
SDR’s dollar value and the prices of exported com-
modities would also moderate a rise in the value of
export revenues in terms of a currency other than the
dollar during periods in which the dollar’s foreign
exchange value is rising.) However, since SDRs can-
not be used as a means of payment between traders,
conversions of a price denominated its SDRs into a
currency-equivalent psice would be necessary before
payment could be made.
SOP-S oreu4n• Aid Link Proposal
Proposals for linking foreign aid to SDR creation
are designed to provide financial assistance to devel-
oping countries.22 The essence of such proposals is
that the IMF allocate significant amounts of SDRs to
developing countries. These countries could then use
SDRs to finance balance-of-payments deficits arising
from tine large voltsme of imports (capital goods, for
exampie) required by their various development pro-
grams. The effect of an SDR-development assistance
hnk would ultimateiy be to transfer resources (tisat is,
“For a recent discussion of the link proposal, see Csmmittee
din Relnrtss of the ls,tenmsatiossal Monetary Syslcsss and Re-
latedl Issues, “Report mu Technical Group on tise SDR/Aid
Link and Belated Proposals,” International Momsetary
Refounu (Washington, DC.: Interssatioisal Monetary Fund,
1974), pp. 95-111.
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goods and services) from tlse itsdustrial nations to the
developing coumstries. It is therefore usshkely to he
accepted so long as the industrial conssstnes resist us-
creasing direct resource tramssfers to the developing
nations.
SUMMAP,.Y
Tise trend toward a systens of “managed floating”
exchange rates has limited the SDR’s importance as a
reserve asset. The 5DB was created ussder a systens
of generally fixed exchange rates and was designed
to fussctioss under that system. Under tine fixed cx-
chassge rate systesn, halance-of-paymssents deficits were
settled by flows of reserve assets between cesstrah
banks. As the system of floating exchange rates lsas
evolved, the role of official international reserves in
general has chassged. Tlse primary usc of issternsa-
tional reserves msder a “nssanaged floatitsg” excisange
rate system is is, central banks’ foreigis exchamsge
snarket isstervesstion policies. Since SDRs caisnot be
held by commercial hassks assd traders (tise major
nongovernment foreign exchsange market partici-
pants), central banks cannot directly use SDRs to
influence exchange rates. Ratlser, SDRs must be con-
verted, usually with IMF guidassce, into an interna-
tionally acceptable curresscy before being used to
affect exchasnge rate movemessts.
I-Iowever, a proposed amessdmesst to the IMF’s
Articles of Agreesnent is designed, in part, to
stremsgtlsems tlse SDR as a reserve asset. Basically, the
amendmesst would allow a wider range of lsolders of
SDRs amsd more freedom ins tiseir use of SDRs. This
could he a first step toivard aclsievinsg tise IMF’s
objective of “. .. makinsg tise SDR tlse prinscipai re-
serve asset in the imsternatiossal nsonetarv systesn.”23
Because it is valued ins terms of a “basket” of cur-
rencies, the SDR Isas gaissed some importansce as a
ussit of acconssst for itstertsatiossal trasssactions. Tlse
value of ps-ivatelv arrassged imsterssatiossal hank de-
posits, loasss, bonsd issues, and sales of goods and
services cams be htsked to fiucttiatiotss its tlsc SDR’s
relative value. Tlse curreist use of tIne 5DB as a tntsit
of accouist ins privately arransgeci intertsatiomsal tramss-
actions is, however, qnsite limssited.’4
Aithonngh it isas gaimsed some attenstioss as ass imster—
ssatiossai unit of accounst, tise SDR’s roic its itstcrna-
tional transactionss remaisns nssinor. So lossg as tise ivorld
maisstainss a “massaged fioatimsg” systenn of exclsamsge
rates, thsere should he mso desire for interisational re-
serve growth on the scale tlse SDR was intended to
provide.
‘~1MFSurvey (Fall 1976), p. 8.
‘
4
F,sn discnsssious of the SDR’s hinsitations as ass index for
valuisig international trausactiomss, see C. Frederic Wiegold,
‘‘SDII ins 2 Yeats 1 las Failed to Win Acceptassce As a
Cunshioss Against Excisasige F’hinctuatiosss,” -tnsericans Ban,k-cr,
September 14, 1977, pp. 1, 22, arid Gerald Kramer, “What
are SDR’s?” Columbia Journal of World Brininess (Fall
1976), pp. 53-59.
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